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FEDERAL JUDICIAL LAW-MAKING POWER: COMPETENCE AS A
FUNCTION OF COGNIZABLE FEDERAL INTERESTS
INTRODUCTION
Our system of federalism, which distributes legislative power be-
tween national and state governments, requires that the limits of in-
stitutional power be carefully defined and scrupulously observed.' As-
certaining the limits of law-making power is of particular importance
with respect to the federal courts, since federal courts may' in some
cases have the jurisdictional power to entertain certain cases while
lacking the law-making power to choose the rule of decision. 2 That
federal judicial law-making is, in fact, constitutionally circumscribed was
made clear in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.' In Erie, the Supreme Court
held that the application of federal common law to a case arising
under state law and litigated in a federal court on the basis of diver-
sity jurisdiction is an unconstitutional assumption of power. 4
 This de-
claration of unconstitutionality has been understood as recognizing
two general limits on the law-making power, or competence, of the
federal courts.° First, the law-making power of the federal courts can-
not exceed the constitutionally authorized powers of the Congress.°
Thus, where Congress lacks authority to legislate, the federal courts
similarly lack competence to judicially legislate. Second, even in areas
where Congress may properly act, the federal courts lack law-making
power unless Congress has acted so as to supplant state law in that
area.' These limitations on the competence of the federal courts rec-
ognize enclaves of state substantive law constitutionally protected from
incursions by unauthorized federal judicial law-making.
The issue of competence addressed in Erie may be framed as a
question of whether the federal courts are free to choose between
federal or state law as the rule of decision in a particular case, or
whether they are obligated to apply state law. Extrapolating from the
See A.T. Von Mehren & D.T. Trautman, The Law of Multistate Problems,
1049-59 (1965).
2
 United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., Inc. 412 U.S. 580, 591 (1973);
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938),
3
 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
304 U.S. at 77-78. See, e.g., Watson v. McCabe, 527 F.2d 286, 288 (6th Cir.
1975); Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diner's Club, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1, 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1244, 1248 (M.D. Fla. 1972). See also iA Moore,
Federal Practice 1 0.305[3] at 3052-53 (2d ed. 1974); Note, The Competence of the Federal
Courts to Formulate Rules of Decision, 77 HARV. L. REV, 1084, 1087 (1964).
5 See Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie — The Thread, 87 HARV, L. REv. 1682
(1974) (hereinafter cited as Mishkin, The Thread); Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitu-
tion, 53 N.W.U.L. Rev. 427 (1958); Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law". Competence
and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797,
798-802 (1957) (hereinafter cited as Mishkin, Federal Law).
Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV, L. REv. 693, 702-04 (1974); Hill,
supra note 5, at 442.
supra note 5, at 441-45; Mishkin, The Thread, supra note 5, at 1683.
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holding in Erie, which, on the facts denied federal judicial law-making
power where the case was in federal court as a result of the diversity
of citizenship of the parties, federal courts have generally applied the
test that the competence of the courts to choose the applicable law is a
function of the source. of the right sued upon. 8 According to this test,
where the source of the right sued upon is state law, the federal
courts lack competence to choose the rule of decision." In those cases,
as in Erie, state law would apply of its own force." Conversely, where
federal law provides the underlying right, federal courts have found
themselves competent to choose the applicable rule." In the exercise
of that choice, federal courts may choose to apply relevant state law or
they may choose to develop federal common law." Erie and its
progeny" warrant the conclusion—that where the source of the right
sued upon is state substantive law, the federal courts lack competence
and must apply state law. But the rule of Erie does not necessarily ex-
haust the limitations on the power of the federal courts. Despite its
frequent invocation,' 4 the proposition that where the source of the
right is federal law, federal courts are competent to resolve all issues
affecting that right is not a necessary corollary of Erie.
This comment will consider the law-making power of the federal
courts where the right sued upon is provided by federal law and will
suggest that even though a party may sue on a right created by fed-
eral law, certain issues affecting this federal right may in fact, be out-
side the competence of the federal courts where they do not implicate
any cognizable federal interest. A recent case decided by the United
States Court of' Appeals for the Third Circuit, Three Rivers Motors Co.
v. Ford Motor Co.,'' will be analyzed to examine the often-held as-
sumption that unless a case in federal court is controlled by Erie, there
are no limits on the power of the federal courts to determine the rule
of decision. Following consideration of the court's opinion in Three
" Colton v. Swain, 527 F.2d 296, 300 (7th Cir, 1975); Watson v. McCabe, 527
F.2d 286, 288 (6th Cir. 1975); Donegal Steel Founding Co. v. Accurate Products Co.,
516 F.2d 583, 587 n.6 (8th Cir. 1975); Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop,
Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 540-51 n.1 (2d Cir. 1956). But see Dora Elec. Lamp Co. v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 249 F.2d 5, 6 (3rd Cir. 1957); Moniand v. Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp., 37 F. Supp. 649, 655 (W.D. Okla. 1941). See Note, The Competence of Federal
Courts to Formulate Rules of Decision, 77 HAitv. L. REV. 1084, 1087 (1964).
See Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat. Bank, 306 U.S. 103, 107 (1939); Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
See, e.g., Colton v. Swain, 527 F.2(1 296, 300 (7th Cir. 1975); Watson v.
McCabe, 527 F.2d 286, 288 (6th Cir. 1975).
" E.g., Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173. 176 (1942); Columbia
Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3, 14 (4th Cir. 1971); Hill v. Whitlock Oil Ser-
vices, Inc., 450 F.2d 170, 173 (10th Cir. 1971),
12 See Mishkin, Federal Law, supra note 5 at 802.
"The Erie doctrine received elaboration in. e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460
(1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Corp., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); and Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
14 See cases cited at note 11 supra.
1 " 522 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1975).
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Rivers, the principles of federalism underlying the decision in Erie will
be abstracted as a means of identifying limits on the law-making
power of the federal courts. Next, cases will be considered in which
state law seems to have applied its own force, even though Erie was
inapplicable. Finally, Three Rivers will be re-examined in light of the
perspective on the limits of the competence of the federal courts
yielded by these cases.
THE THREE RIVERS CASE
Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co. presented the question
whether federal or state law would determine the scope of a release
interposed as a bar to a private antitrust action." Three Rivers had
operated an automobile dealership under a Ford franchise
agreement. 17 Due to operating losses presumed to have resulted in
part from competition with another Ford-owned dealership in the
same area, Three Rivers sought to resign the franchise." Under the
original franchise agreement, Ford had the option but not the obliga-
tion to repurchase Three Rivers' inventory.' 9 Ford had unilaterally al-
tered the agreement, however, by obligating itself to repurchase the
inventory in exchange for the dealer's execution of a general
release." Three years after the execution of the release, Three Rivers
filed an antitrust action alleging, inter alio, a price fixing arrangement
between Ford and the competing Ford owned dealership."
The district court held that, as a matter of federal common law,
the release did not bar the claim, since there was no intention on the
part of Three Rivers to release the antitrust cause of action." On ap-
"Id. at 888. The claim was brought under section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. .515 (1970).




21 Id. at 888.
22 Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 374 F. Supp. 620, 629 (W.D. Pa.
1974). In determining whether to apply federal common law, the district court began
with the proposition that federal policy mandates heavy reliance on private enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws. Id. at 624. The court then suggested that in light of this pol-
icy "federal law should wholly displace State law governing the release of antitrust
claims." Id. In support of this position the court extensively quoted Zenith Radio Corp.
v. Hazeltine Research, Inc„ 401 U.S. 321, 343-48 (1971), which applied federal com-
mon law to determine the effect of releases on joint tortfeasors, Three Rivers Motors
Co. v. Ford Motor Co., supra, at 624-26. Next, the district court in Three Rivers
extensively quoted Novak v. General Elec. Corp., '282 F. Supp. 1010, 1013-14, 1016
(E.D. Pa. 1967), in which the court developed the wholly different proposition that state
law should apply as a matter of federal choice. Three Rivers Motors Corp. v. Ford
Motor Co., supra, at 626-27. Finding that the state law was allowed and supported by
antitrust policy, the Novak court applied the state rule that the effect of the release is fo
be determined by the intent of the parties. Novak v. General Elec. Corp., supra, at 1019,
1023. These two approaches seem incompatible, unless a case presents the happy coin-
cidence in which a particular state rule exactly parallels the only appropriate federal
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peal, the Third Circuit confronted the threshold issue of the power of
the federal courts to choose the applicable rule. It concluded, as had
the district court, 23 that the holding of Erie and its progeny did not
apply, since the source of the right affected by the release was a fed-
eral statutory program." The Third Circuit apparently assumed that
since Erie did not deny the court authority to fashion the controlling
law there was no further need to examine the competence of the
court with respect to specific issues; thus, on resolving the specific
issue of the release the court determined that it could choose either
federal or state law." In making that choice, the court weighed the
respective state and federal interests in the release. Three factors were
considered determinative of whether state or federal law would apply:
the need for a uniform rule, the extent to which the transaction
under review is normally defined and guided by state law, and the
possibility that the application of the state rule would frustrate the na-
tional policies implicit in the federal antitrust legislation."
Analyzing these factors, the court first concluded that there was
no need for a uniform rule regarding the construction of releases."
The court reasoned that since the parties could achieve their ultimate
purposes by merely tailoring their agreements to the applicable re-
quirements there would be no practical difference whether there was
a single federal rule or separate state rules." Second, the court con-
cluded that "[s]tate law customarily governs the field of contracts and
it is to state rather than federal law that private parties are likely to
refer when formulating the terms of a contractual release."" Finally,
no conflict was discerned between the state rule for the interpretation
rule. On one hand, if the overriding concern is maintenance of a "uniform federal
rule," reliance on Novak is misplaced. The reasoning in Novak attempts to justify the
choice of state law where the state rule does not conflict with federal policy. Presuma-
bly, under Novak, use of state law would be appropriate in any state in which the issue
arose. Thus, another federal court in a different circuit could, following Novak, choose
to adopt the rule of a different state as the "uniform federal," rule resulting in a surfeit
of "uniform rules." On the other hand, if the rule articulated in Zenith controls, and
federal law wholly displaces state law on the issue of release of antitrust claims, then a
Novak-type examination of state law is wholly superfluous. The district court in Three
Rivers, however, mixed these incompatible approaches to decide that as a matter of
"uniform federal law," the intent of the parties to a release determines the effect of the
release. See Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., supra, at 629.
The ease with which the district court moved from an assertion of general fed-
eral policy to the development of federal common law is an indication of the need for
more rigorous attention to the threshold issue of competence, in order to avoid unjusti-
fiable expansion of federal judicial power.
23 Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 374 F. Supp. 620, 626 (W,D. Pa.
1974), citing Novak v. General Elec. Corp., 282 F. Supp, 1010, 1013 (E.D. Pa, 1967).
24 522 F.2d at 888-89.
"Id. at 889.
"Id. at 889-90.
" Id. at 890.
28 Id.
25 1d. at 891.
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of release and federal antitrust objectives. 30 As a result of these con-
clusions, the appellate court chose to apply state law, as opposed to
federal law, in order to define the effect of the release. 3 ' Under the
state rule of construction, the release was deemed a general settlement
of accounts, thereby barring Three Rivers' claim against Ford Motor
Co.32
It is noteworthy that no federal interest was identified by the
Third Circuit. In fact, both the court's argument against a uniform
federal rule and its conclusion that no conflict between the state rule
and federal policies exists seem persuasive only insofar as they reflect
an implicit finding that there are no cognizable federal interests in re-
leases of antitrust claims.
With respect to the issue of a uniform rule, it is apparent that
were there substantive federal interests in releases of antitrust claims,
a formal federal rule could certainly have been fashioned to promote
those interests. For example, if federal antitrust policy mandated spe-
cial efforts to preserve private antitrust claims, the court might have
considered a rule that would preserve antitrust claims until they were
explicitly released. 33 Or, the court might have assigned to the released
party the burden of proof on issues of intent or adequacy of
consideration." In either case the rules would not function as formal
requirements to which the parties must adjust. Rather, such rules
would establish presumptions in favor of avoiding arguably unfair or
inadvertent settlements. The court's choice of state law is defensible,
therefore, not because a uniform federal rule could not make a dif-
ference as the court argued," but because there is no statutory basis
which mandates such a difference.
Similarly, the absence of any federal interest in releases of anti-
trust claims may be inferred from the court's conclusion that the state
law was compatible with federal policy. Certainly, the state rule which
served to bar the antitrust claim was not adopted affirmatively to en-
hance any federal policy. Rather, the state rule seemed acceptable
simply because there was no federal policy with which it was in direct
conflict. While the Third Circuit did not directly address the issue of
the existence of federal interests, the arguments advanced by the
court in support of the choice of state law necessarily lend support to
the position that no special federal interest in releases of antitrust
claims exists. 3 °
The analytic structure applied by the Third Circuit in Three Riv-
ers involved a threshold determination that the court had competence
to choose the rule of decision, followed by a weighing of state and




Dice v. Akron, C & Y R.R,, 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
a' Cf. Sampson v. Channel!, l 10 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1940).
3 ' Id at 890-91.
" See ad. at 891.
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federal interests in order to make that choice." Certain aspects of
federalism are manifested by this process. In particular, this structure
recognizes the systemic presumption in favor of the choice of state law
and the need to identify affirmatively specific federal interests in
order to overcome that presumption. 38 Other aspects of federalism,
however, that relate not to the choice of the applicable rule but to the
very power to choose in the first instance were submerged in Three
Rivers when the court, based on its ruling that Erie did not apply, as-
sumed thereby that there were no limits on its competence. 30
 Al-
though the Third Circuit was correct in deciding that Erie is inapplic-
able to the facts of Three Rivers, an analysis of the principles of
federalism that sustained the decision in Erie serves to identify limits
on the law-making power of the federal courts even where, as in Three
Rivers, the federal courts adjudicate rights created by federal law.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF FEDERALISM AND THE LIMITS ON FEDERAL
JUDICIAL POWER
In Erie, the substantive issue before the court concerned .the
standard of care owed by the Erie Railroad to a pedestrian who had
been injured by a passing train while walking along Erie's right of way
in Pennsylvania." The Court of Appeals had considered the issue of
the standard of care to be a matter of "general law," 4 ' which under
the rule of Swift v. Tyson,'" could be formulated by the federal
judiciary. The doctrine of Swift was based on an interpretation of the
Rules of Decision Act, which provided that "the laws of the several
states, except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United
37 The choice of state law may differ in significant ways From the mandatory ap-
plication of state law under the Erie doctrine. Essentially, where federal courts are com-
petent to choose or reject state law, they act wholly outside of the area in which Erie
and its progeny operate. Thus, Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496
(1941), which required federal courts in diversity actions to utilize the choice of law
rules of the forum state is inapplicable where state law applies as a matter of federal
choice. Similarly, competent federal courts are free of collateral Erie doctrines which di-
rect the determination of what is the state law. See King v. Order of United Comml
Travelers, 333 U.S. 153, 161.62 (1948); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169,
177-78 (1940). Finally, unlike the required application of state law, federal choice of
state law permits both the examination of the merits of the state rule and the rejection
of that rule where its application would conflict with federal policy. See, e.g., Wallis v.
Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966); Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v.
Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204. 210 (1946). For a detailed discussion of the implications
of federal choice of state law and an investigation of the relevant criteria, see Mishkin,
Federal Law, supra note 5, at 810-834.
38 See Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. Rtx. 1512 (1969).
39 522 F.2d at 888-89.
49
 304 U.S. at 69-70. The Court made clear that the importance of the case lay
not in the resolution of the substantive issue, but in the resolution of the question posed
at the beginning of the opinion: "The question ... whether the oft-challenged doctrine
of Swift v. Tyson shall now be disapproved." Id. at 69.
" Tompkins v. Erie R.R., 90 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1937).
12 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) I (1842).
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States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of
decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States in
cases where they apply."'" The phrase "the laws of the several states"
was interpreted in Swift to encompass only the state statutory law, thus
permitting the federal courts to disregard the decisional law of the
states."
in disapproving the Swift doctrine, the Court in Erie first con-
cluded, on the basis of new historical evidence,'" that the statutory
construction of Swift was erroneous; the word "laws" had been in-
tended to mean both decisional and statutory law." However, the
court did not rest its holding solely on the statutory construction
ground. The decision to overrule Swift was also based on the finding
that Swift resulted in an unconstitutional assumption of law-making
power by the federal judiciary. 47 At first, commentators reviewing the
decision dismissed the significance of the constitutional argument by
pointing out that the court had failed to identify any constitutional
provision which was directly 'violated by the Swift doctrine." Recent
commentators, however, have recognized the significance of the con-
stitutional argument finding that it is precisely the absence of any ex-
plicit constitutional provision conferring power on the federal courts
unilaterally to develop substantive law that renders the doctrine of'
Swift an unconstitutional assumption of power.'" The decision in Erie
therefore recognized an implicit diffusion of law-making power in our
federal system inferable from the general scheme of the constitution
rather than from any specific provision.'"
A schema of the allocation of law-making initiative among the
federal and state legislatures and judiciaries indicates in a general
way, the limits on federal judicial competence. Within this structure,
the starting point for the regulation of individual action has been the
common law as applied and interpreted by state courts." State legisla-
tures act in light of this common law. By altering the common law or
4 .1 judiciary Act of 1789 ch. 20 $ 34, 1 Stat. 92, as amended 28 U.S.C. $1652
(1970).
44
 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18.
45 See Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37
HARV. L. REV. 49, 51-52, 85-88 (1923).
an 304 U.S. at 72-73.
47 Id. at 77-78.
" Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tomp-
kins, 55 YALE L. J. 267, 278 (1946); Keefe, Gilhooley, Bailey & Day, Weary Erie, 34 CORN.
L.Q. 494, 497 (1949).
4° Ely, supra note 6. at 702-04; Hill, supra note 5, at 437-45. One commentator
has argued that although it is unusual for a constitutional decision to avoid making
specific reference to the Constitution, if the Court says it is deciding a case on constitu-
tional grounds, it is wisest to assume that such a statement is not dicta. C. Witutirr,
H Arm Wok or 'nil: LAIN Of FEDERAL. COURTS 231-32 (2d ed. 1970).
5° Mishkin, The Thread, supra note 5, at 1685.
Sr H. HART A. SACKS, TIIE LEGAL. PROCESS, 185-86 (tent. ed. 1958); Hart, The
Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLum. L. REV. 489, 492 (1954),
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adding to it, state legislatures give expression to the interests of a state
government in regulating the activity of its citizens. 52 Action by state
legislatures, of course, serves to direct the state judiciary, but where
the legislature has not acted the residual power to make law remains
in the state courts. 53
On the national level, the law-making initiative rests with the
Congress." Congress has constitutional authority to change or sup-
plant state law in effectuating what is necessary and proper to imple-
ment permissible national interests. 55 No such general constitutional
authority is conferred on the federal courts. 5" Therefore, federal'
courts derive law-making power from the presence of a federal in-
terest that merits judicial protection or elaboration." The proposition
that "[t]here is no federal general common law" 5" recognizes that fed-
22
 H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LECAl. PROCESS 186-87 (tent. ed. 1958).
" Id, at 186.
24 Commentators have disagreed over whether the denial of legislative initiative
in the federal courts is constitutionally required or congressionally imposed by the
Rules of Decision Act. Compare Ely, supra note 6, at 700-06 with Mishkin, The Thread,
supra note 5, at 1682-86. The more compelling argument seems to be that the Act was
not simply a discretionary enactment creating an enclave of state law protected from
displacement by the federal courts; rather, this Act seemed to recognize a stateffederal
power structure that was constitutionally required. This position draws support from
the frequent statement in case law that the Rules of Decision Act merely declared the
rule that would have existed absent any statute. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S.
99, 103-04 (1945); Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545, 559 (1923). Further, it seems
alien to the careful attention to separation and limitation of institutional power in the
constitution to conclude that absent a Rules of Devision Act, individual federal judges
would possess the substantive law-making power of the representative national legisla-
ture.
Consideration of the allocation of political power in the federal system reinforces
the judgment that limitations on the law-making power of the federal judiciary are con-
stitutionally and not just legislatively mandated. The primary vehicles for change in the
common law are the state legislatures, which permit the most direct input by the popu-
lation affected by those changes. To argue that federal power to supplant that state law
is constitutionally exercised only by the Congress is to recognize the representative polit-
ical power of the states in that institution. The absence of comparable input into the
federal judiciary seems to justify restrictions on judicial power that do not apply to the
national legislature. See Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 CoLust. L. REV. 543
(1954).
" U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, 	 •
" Mishkin, The Thread, supra note 5, at 1682-83.
22
 Since it is likely that Congress has the power to adopt substantive rules for lia-
bility for accidents on interstate routes under the Commerce Clause, Erie may be viewed
as illustrating the lack of federal judicial competence where Congress has not acted, and
not the lack of judicial competence where Congress cannot act. However, under the rule
of Swift, the federal courts were not making substantive law to apply in state courts.
Rather, federal courts were fashioning substantive rules that applied to state-created
causes of action litigated in federal courts. See Mishkin, The Thread, supra note 5, at
1684 n.10. Though it is not entirely clear, it does not seem that Congress has the Con-
stitutional authority to enact laws to be applied only to diversity cases. See Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 202 (1956). But see Ely, supra note 5, at 706-07 n.77.
Thus, it would seem that in fact Erie represented a situation where the federal courts as
well as Congress lacked competence.
"Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
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eral courts, unlike state courts, have no residual power to make law.
Given these general limitations on the competence of the federal
courts, the specific relationships between federal legislative action,
state law, and federal judicial competence can be discerned. Federal
legislation is interstitial, rarely occupying an entire field. 59 It is virtu-
ally impossible to develop a self-sufficient body of statutory law that
gives definitive treatment to all concepts, relationships and transac-
tions that are implicated in the operation of a statutory program.
Federal legislation is thus enacted against the backdrop of state law
and relies upon state law to give contextual muscle to skeletal federal
statutory schemes." At the same time, effective federal action requires
vesting in federal courts the power to effectuate the legislative policies
and programs by judicially filling out the statutory patterns." The
presumption in favor of the applicability of state law represents def-
erence on the part of the federal judiciary to congressional reliance
on state law to supplement federal enactments." 2 The federal judiciary
supervises this interaction between federal and state law and chooses
to interpose federal common law only where a uniform rule is neces-
sary to effectuate federal interests" or where a conflict between the
relevant state law and federal policies can be identified."
Because it is interstitial by nature, federal legislation is limited in
scope;° 5 not only does the corpus juris of the states fill in interstitially
but also state law picks up at the boundaries of the limited federal ac-
tion. To the extent that federal legislative action encompasses particu-
lar issues, federal courts have law-making competence. Federal courts
thus serve to backstop the interstitial application of state law, ensuring
that federal policies are carried out by applying uniform federal rules
or by supplanting state law where necessary. To the extent that federal
interests do not encompass a particular issue, however, state law sup-
plies the applicable rule, not interstitially as a matter of federal choice,
but rather as a reservoir of substantive law which lies beyond the con-
fines of federal choice and which picks up at the limits of congres-
sional action. Where federal legislative interests are absent then, fed-
eral courts have no basis on which to assert competence and therefore
state law should apply of its own force.
In light of this analysis, it is imprecise to conclude that the com-
petence of the federal courts is a function of the source of the right
sued upon. More precisely, federal judicial competence is a function
" P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS ANI) THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 470-71 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as
HART & WECHSLER].
" Id. at 971.
" Mishkin, Federal Law, supra note 5, at 800.
"See, e.g., Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966).
"a See, e,g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 381 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
"' See, e.g., Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204, 210
(1946).
85 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 51, at 470-71.
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of the scope of cognizable federal interests." The latter proposition
recognizes that a threshold determination of general competence may
not be sufficient to reach all of the specific issues that might affect a
substantive federal right. Within the context of general competence,
certain issues may arise which fall beyond the scope of any federal in-
terest and therefore, should be controlled by state law.
Although federal courts have not explicitly articulated this
proposition,"' they seem functionally to follow it in at least three con-
texts. Even when general competence in the federal judiciary has been
acknowledged, state law has been seen to apply of its own force in
admiralty cases, cases in which national sovereignty is implicated, and
cases where federal courts act to effectuate federal statutory policies.
In each of these contexts, judicial competence seems to have been
limited to the cognizable federal interests.
III. COMPETENCE AS A FUNCTION OF FEDERAL INTERESTS
A. Limits on Judicial Power in Admiralty
Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, maritime law existed
as a distinct body of law outside the control of the particular states. 68
The Constitution institutionalized this situation by declaring jurisdic-
tion over admiralty matters to be exclusively within the federal judicial
power." The unique history of maritime law and this jurisdictional
power have combined to invest substantive law-making power in the
federal courts and in the national legislature." The resulting opera-
56 While this comment considers that the issue of competence requires an analysis
of the presence or absence of federal interest, one commentator has suggested that the
line of Erie cases is understandable as involving the weighing of the respective state and
federal interests. Leathers, Erie and its Progeny as Choice of Law Cases, 11 Hous. L. Rix.
791, 792 (1974).
The role of some sort of interest in analysis in Erie deliberations was first sug-
gested by the Court in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
There, the Court reasoned that an important federal interest — in that instance a trial
by jury — would warrant the application of a federal rule. The significance of this
analysis was diluted when the right to a jury trial was deemed constitutionally required,
Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963), since federal courts are always competent
to supplant an unconstitutional state rule.
Citing Byrd, the Fourth Circuit has applied an interest analysis to determine that
the existence of a state door-closing statute would not bar a case from federal court
since the federal interest in providing a convenient forum pursuant to the court's con-
stitutional power to have jurisdiction of cases litigated by parties of diverse citizenship
prevails over the state interest in relieving docket congestion. Szantay v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir, 1965). See also Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308, 313-18 (6th
Cir. 1975).
"Cf. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 357 (1966); see also note 157 infra. A.
VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 1055 (1965).
68 G. GILMORE & C. BI.ACK,L TI IE LAW OF AminiALTv 10- (2d ed. 1975).
" U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. This judicial power was implemented by section 9 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 77 [now 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970)1.
"See Note, From Judicial Grant to Legislative Power: The Admiralty Clause in the
Nineteenth Century, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1214 (1954).
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tion of this federal power is comparable to the development of sub-
stantive law within a state through the interaction of the common law
and the direction of the legislature with general law making authority
vesting in the state judiciary. Therefore, admiralty embodies a uni-
form body of federal substantive law, to the exclusion of the intersti-
tial input of state law."
One prominent exception to this general scheme may be found
where state law has been applied to permit a cause of action for
wrongful death." It is in this context that limits on judicial compe-
tence become apparent. The problem of providing a remedy for
wrongful death first arose in The Hai-risburg, 73 where a common law
remedy for wrongful death was denied under maritime law by
the Supreme Court." In Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia,''' however, to
mitigate the hardship of this rule, state law was permitted to supple-
ment maritime law to provide a statutory basis for a wrongful death
action. The inclusion of state law, while held inoffensive to the princi-
ple of the uniformity of maritime law, 76
 generated questions concern-
ing the power of the federal courts to oversee the application of state
law."
In The Tungus v. Skovgaurd," the Supreme Court considered
whether state law merely provided a remedy for wrongful death that
was otherwise denied under federal law, or whether state law also
supplied the particular rules that were determinative of liability. 79 The
case involved the death of Skovgaard, the maintenance foreman of
the company engaged to discharge the Tungus' cargo of coconut oil,
who slipped on previously spilled oil and fell to his death."" Congress
" Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917).
72
 Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921).
75 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
.7" Id. at 213. The rule of The Harrisburg has been reversed and admiralty now al-
lows a common law remedy for wrongful death. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,
398 U.S. 375, 409 (1970).
25
 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921).
"The Tungus v, Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 594 (1959).
22
 Prior to the decision in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375
(1970), see note 74 supra, the search for a rule of decision presented an intriguing puz-
zle. Under the savings clause, states courts were granted jurisdiction to hear cases aris-
ing in admiralty. 28 U.S.C. § .1333(1) (1970). A state court hearing a claim was, of
course, bound to apply uniform maritime law. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S.
205, 215 (1917). In a claim for wrongful death, however, maritime law permitted state
wrongful death statutes to serve as a basis for a wrongful death claim in admiralty that
was not recognized under federal common law. Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S.
233, 242 (1921). Thus, states were in the position of applying federal maritime law,
which in turn applied state law. Further, in claims brought under federal jurisdiction,
the federal court would have to determine additionally whether the state, in applying its
own wrongful death statute, would apply special maritime standards or general tort
standards to determine liability for the maritime tort. The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358
U.S. 588, 595 (1959).
7"
 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
2" Id, at 591,
"Id. at 589.
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had passed both the Jones Act and the Death on the High Seas Act
which provided for recovery for wrongful death." However, since
Skovgaard was not a seaman he was not covered by the Jones Act and
since his death occurred while the Tungus was docked within the ter-
ritorial waters of New Jersey, the Death on the High Seas Act was
inapplicable." Consequently any right of recovery by the plaintiff de-
pended solely on the New Jersey wrongful death statute, there being
no common law maritime action for wrongful death. 83 The issue pre-
sented to the Court was whether New Jersey law on wrongful death
encompassed a cause of action based on the unseaworthiness of a ves-
sel.
Four members of the Court in dissent argued that it was un-
necessary to examine the scope of the New Jersey statute. 84 It was
reasoned that state law merely supplies a remedy unavailable under
maritime law for a breach of duty of care that is in fact recognized
under maritime law. The dissent therefore considered that the incor-
poration of a state's remedy does not preclude federal judicial law-
making power to declare the elements of liability and the standards to
be applied."
The majority held, however, that state law applied as an inte-
grated whole since the sovereign power creating a right "includes of
necessity the power to determine when recovery shall be permitted
and when it shall not." 88
On the basis of the holding in The Tungus requiring state law to
be applied as an integrated whole and denying federal judicial power
to determine the elements of the right established by the law, the
Supreme Court in Hess v. United•States," similarly upheld the applica-
bility of an Oregon wrongful death statute to permit recovery that was
unobtainable under maritime law. 88 The Court did so even though
the Oregon liability law which served as the basis for the claim required
a standard of care to avoid liability more stringent than the standard
applied under admiralty standards." Justice Harlan, in a complex and
rigorous dissent" which would have denied the applicability of the
Oregon statute altogether, evaluated the case in light of the extent of
the federal competence issue.
First, Justice Harlan 'distinguished The Tungus, asserting that dif-
ferent issues were involved in the respective cases. Justice Harlan
pointed out that in The Tungus the issue was whether the elements of
81 Id. at 590-91.
"Id. at 591.
" See text at notes 72-77 supra.
" 4 358 U.S. al 600-04
" Id. at 608-09.
' 15 1d. at 594,
"7 361 U.S. 314 (1960).
"Id. at 321.
" See id, at 323 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 322.
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state law as applied by the state were controlling, where state law has
been accepted as the vehicle for a wrongful death action." Harlan ac-
cepted the conclusion that state law must apply as an integrated whole
since there is no basis on which the federal court could vary the limi-
tations and conditions of a right which involved no federal interests."
He found, however, that Hess presented a different issue, involving a
threshold determination whether the state law as an integrated whole
is compatible with federal interests, in this instance those represented
by general maritime law." Since the statute applied in The Tungus re-
quired a standard of care consistent with the duty of care required
under general maritime law, its application would make "no meaning-
ful inroads on federal interests."94 On the other hand, the Oregon
statute at issue in Hess imposed a duty of care more stringent than
would be required in the adjudication of maritime torts not resulting
in death. Thus, the effect of applying the Oregon statute would be to
permit the states to encroach on federal interests." 5 Noting that under
The Tungus, the federal courts do not have the authority to alter the
standards applied under state law, Justice Harlan concluded that the
Court should, in the exercise of its power to protect federal interests,
not allow the Oregon statute to supplement maritime law."
In so arguing, Justice Harlan apparently recognized that judicial
law-making competence may exist, and yet a court may still lack com-
petence with respect to certain issues. Because of general federal con-
trol of admiralty matters, there is certainly a federal interest in
whether a claim for wrongful death under state law will be permitted
to supplement maritime law. As a function of the federal interest,
general judicial competence exists to deny the application of state law
where it impinges on established interests. This law-making power,
however, is not an unlimited one allowing federal courts on one hand
to adopt a state-created remedy and on the other to retain the power
to establish independently the conditions and limitations of that right.
Rather, once state law is adopted by federal choice as a supplement to
maritime law, the particular conditions and limitations established by
the state implicate no further federal interests. Therefore, even in the
context of general judicial law-making power, where state law is cho-
sen as compatible with federal interests, the elements of the state
created right apply of their own force.
B. Limits on Judicial Power in the Effectuation of National Sovereignty
The power to develop federal common law for the resolution of issues
concerning national sovereignty was established five years after Erie in Clear-
s" Id.
" See id. at 330-33.
" Id. at 322.
"Id. at 332.
"Id. at 333-34.
" Id. at 338-39.
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field Trust Co. v. United States." In Clearfield, the question on review
involved the rights and duties of the United States on commercial
paper it had issued pursuant to its Constitutional and statutory
powers."" Clearfield Trust Co. had cashed a government check that
had been stolen and orginally cashed by means of a forged
endorsement." Clearfield Trust Co. then endorsed the check to the
Federal Reserve Bank for payment guaranteeing all prior
endorsements.'"° Over nine months later, the federal government
notified Clearfield Trust of the fact of the forgery and demanded
reimbursement.'" Under the applicable state law, the delay in notifi-
cation constituted a complete defense.'" The Supreme Court held
that despite the fact that no specific federal statutory provision relates
to the facts of the case, the federal court was competent to choose the
applicable rule. 1 °3 The Court reasoned that the rights and duties of
the United States were rooted in federal sources in that the United
States was acting as national sovereign in the exercise of its constitu-
tional function when it issued and paid the check.'° 4
The recognition that federal courts are competent where na-
tional sovereignty is involved established a wide sphere of judicial
law-making initiative.'" However, limits on that power were sug-
" 318 U.S, 363 (1943).
"" Id. at 366.
" Id. at 364-65.
10° Id. at 365.
IN Id .
"2 1d. at 366.
"2 /d. at 367. The Court in Clearfield chose to apply uniform federal law as the
rule of decision in order to avoid subjecting the rights and duties of the United States
to exceptional uncertainty. Id. While the assumption of competence by the Court seems
justified by the national interests involved, the choice of a uniform rule has been criti-
cized. See Mishkin, The Van'ousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice
of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 830-32 (1957).
'" 318 U.S. at 366-67.
' 1" Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67
CoLum. L. REV. 1024, 1039 (1967). The wide scope of this law-making initiative was re-
cently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in United States v. Little Lake Misere Land
Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1972). In Little Lake, the Court held that federal and not state law
governs government acquisition of land authorized by the Migratory Bird Conservation
Act, 45 Stat. 1222, 16 U.S.C. § 715 et seq. In so doing, the majority reasoned that where
the transactions at issue bear heavily on a federal regulatory program, federal courts
have the law-making power to fill out the statutory patterns enacted by Congress. 412
U.S. at 592-93. Applying the law to the facts, the Court concluded that since Little Lake
involved "... the interpretation of a land acquisition agreement (a) explicitly authorized
though not precisely governed by the Migratory Bird Conservation Act and (b) to which
the United States is a party," 412 U.S. at 594, uniform federal law was applicable to the
land acquisition at issue.
While the Court's conclusion that, in fact, the Migratory Bird Conservation Act
embodies federal interests in the regulation of government acquisition of state property
is unpersuasive, particularly since the majority opinion acknowledged that the acquisi-
tions are "not precisely governed by the Migratory Bird Act" (both Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Stewart find no such interests and conclude that state law should apply), the
Court's rationale is instructive for federal-state choice of' law principles. By approaching
the problem not at one of identifying the source of the right sued upon but instead, as
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gested thirteen years later in Bank of America National Trust and Savings
Association v. Parnell.'" In Bank of America, stolen government "bearer"
bonds were presented for collection by one Parnell on behalf of a sec-
ond party.'" The issue before the court was whether Parnell had
converted the bonds in good faith without knowledge of the defect. in
the title. 10" In seeking to resolve that issue, the problem arose as to
whether federal or state law would control the - assignment of the bur-
den of proof."" The Court of Appeals for the Tluid Circuit, follow-
ing Clearfield, applied federal common law and placed the burden of
proof on the Bank to show notice and lack of good faith on the part
of Parnell."° The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the litiga-
tion, while involving government bonds, was entirely between private
parties and did not implicate federal interests."' Consequently, state
rules as to burden of proof and good faith would be the controlling
law." 2
In concluding that state law would determine the liabilities of the
parties in private transactions involving the government bonds, the
Court gave no explicit indication whether state law applied on the
basis of federal judicial choice or on the basis that the federal courts
were incompetent to do otherwise. However the court stated:
The present litigation is purely between private par-
ties and does not touch the rights and duties or the United
States. The only possible interest of the United States in a
situation like the one here, exclusively involving the trans-
fer of government paper between private persons, is that
the floating of securities of the United States might some-
how be affected by the local rule of a particular state re-
garding the liability of a converter. This is far too specula-
tive, far too remote a possibility to justify the application of
federal law to transactions essentially of local concern."'
If there is no cognizable federal interest in the transaction in question
on what basis would the federal courts have the authority to choose or
to reject a particular state's rule? Acknowledging the absence of any
one of evaluating the scope of federal interests, the court seemingly acknowledged sub
silentio what has been the operative principle: that federal judicial law-making power is
a function of the scope of federal interests. As in Clearfield, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) federal
courts assert law-making power where federal interests can be identified. This comment
is suggesting the converse of this approach, that where analysis reveals no federal in-
terests in a particular issue (even where the underlying right arises under federal law)
there is no law-making power in the federal judiciary.
" 1" 352 U.S. 29 (1956).
tuT Id, at 30-31.
"" hi. at 31.
1 "" Id. at 31.32.
"" Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. 4ss'n v. Rocco, 226 F.2d 297, 299 (3d
Cir. 1955).
"' Bank of America, 352 U.S. at 33.
Id. at 33-34.
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federal interest seems to be merely another way of expressing the fact
that no federal policy needed to be implemented or safeguarded by
the federal judiciary. Absent the factor of a federal interest, the reser-
voir of state law rather than the island of federal law would govern
the transaction.
The Court's dictum in Bank of America reinforces this conclusion.
The court cautioned:
We do not mean to imply that litigation with respect to
Government paper necessarily precludes the presence of a
federal interest to be governed by federal law in all situa-
tions merely because it is a suit between private parties, or
that it is beyond the range of federal legislation to deal
comprehensively with Government paper." 4
The first part of the statement recognizes the common understanding
that federal interests may be involved in suits between private parties
and that where such interests are present, even in suits arising under
state law, federal law governs those issues. The latter portion of the
Court's dictum is more revealing since it would seem obvious that if
the federal courts have law-making competence with respect to all is-
sues involving Government paper, certainly the Congress would have
similar competence. It is only where certain issues are found to be
beyond the competence of the federal courts where Congress has not
acted in that it is useful to clarify that it is not necessarily beyond the
competence of the legislature to act with respect to those same
issues.' is Thus, the Court seems to be acknowledging the different
limits applicable to the law-making power of the courts and the law-
making power of the legislature. As an example of such limits on the
judiciary Bank of America can be best understood, therefore, as recog-
nizing that the simple fact that Government bonds are involved is,
without more, insufficient to authorize federal judicial law-making
power, leaving state law to apply of its own force. Thus, the case
seems to warrant the conclusion that the Court lacked law-making
competence and that as a result, state law applied of its own force."°
C. Limits on Judicial Power in the Implementation of Federal Statutes
The third context in which general federal judicial competence
is recognized but seemingly limited by the scope of federal interests
involved is the enforcement and implementation of federal legislative
policies and programs. The existence and breadth of this judicial
power was candidly recognized by Justice Jackson, concurring in
'" Id. at 39.
"" See discussion at notes 5-7 supra.
"" But see Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 702-03 n.12 (1972) (Bank
of America cited in dictum as example of federal choice of state law); see also Mishkin
supra note 103 at 824-28 wherein Bank of America is assumed as an example of the fed-
eral judicial choice of state law and the principles of that choice are analyzed.
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D'Oench Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (F.D.I.C.).' 17
The F.D.I.C. had made a loan to a commercial bank, receiving as part
of the collateral security a note given to the bank by the defendant.""
The bank defaulted on the loan and the F.D.I.C. sued to collect on
the note." 9 The bank asserted that the note lacked consideration and
had been given to the bank as collateral only on condition that it
would not be enforced.'" The majority opinion barred this defense as
violative of federal policy but did not explicitly identify the source of
the Court's power to apply federal common law."' Justice Jackson's
concurring opinion addressed this specific issue.
After acknowledging that no statutory provision concerning the
federally-established F.D.I.C. purported to define the rights of that
agency with regard to the transaction under consideration,' 22
 Justice
Jackson posed the question "whether in deciding the case we are
bound to apply the law of some particular state or whether, to put it
bluntly, we may make our own law from materials found in common-
law sources." 123 Justice Jackson answered this question by arguing that
federal common law is necessary to implement the Constitution and
federal statutes."' Where the policies of the federal government are
implicated the federal courts must he empowered to effectuate those
purposes.'" The F.D.I.C. had been created to provide security for the
entire banking and credit structure.'" To achieve this purpose, Jus-
tice Jackson argued, there must be reliance on the integrity of bank
statements."' Allowing a note which was knowingly used for the pur-
pose of disguising a loss to be immune from collection would permit a
continuing fraud on creditors and would undercut the goal of stability
sought by the establishment of the F.D.I.C."" Consequently, federal
judicial law-making power is warranted not only when it is necessary
to implement explicit statutory provisions, but also when it is neces-
sary to ensure the effectuation of implicit policies, as in the instant
case.' 21)
Notwithstanding the breadth of the judicial law-making power
explained by Justice Jackson, such power is not without limits. An at-
tempt to identify conceptually the limits of federal judicial law-making
power has been made above in the discussion on the structure of
77 315 U.S. 447, 471-72 (1942) Jackson, J., concurring).
"" 315 U.S. at 454.
"" Id. at 453-54.
12" Id. at 456.
121 1d. at 458.
'" Id. at 468 (Jackson, J., concurring).
'"Id.
124 1d, at 472.
12 ' Id. at 469-70.
1211 1d. at 472.
1271d,
128 Id, at 472-73.
1 " Id. at 472.
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law-making power in a federalist system."° There it was submitted
that while federal courts, in effect, "backstop" federal legislation by
resolving issues that arise in the interstices, certain issues may arise
that are beyond the boundaries of congressional concern and as such
are beyond the scope of federal judicial competence. The difficulty
arises in trying to determine which issues fall in the interstices and
which are beyond the scope of cognizable federal interests. One pos-
sible solution to this problem is reflected in the treatment of issues in
a horizontal conflict of laws situation, in which the substantive laws of
one state may be applied in the courts of another. Generally, where
the forum state applies the tort law of another state, it will also apply
those rules which have been fashioned by the other state and which
are essential elements of the recognized right.' 31 Subsidiary issues the
resolution of which do not affect the nature of the substantive right,
merit a separate determination of the governing rule. Since these
issues—primarily those matters sounding in contract, such as the in-
terpretation of releases, 132 the validity of assignments,t 33 and compe-
tency to contract 134 —cannot affect revisions of the basic right, they
have a legal identity distinct from the underlying right. Thus, al-
though one state supplies the rules determining the elements of in-
jury, the standards of liability, and the conditions on the remedy, the
release of that right may be interpreted by the rules of another state.
This difference between issues that are part and parcel of the
right and those that are subsidiary helps identify the scope of the in-
terest of the sovereign creating that right. Where the issue under con-
sideration is part and parcel of a federally created right, the power to
resolve the issue rests with the sovereign creating the right.'" Thus,
the fact of federal creation of a right manifests sufficient interest in
the elements of that right to confer competence on the federal courts
to choose the applicable law with respect to all issues integrally related
to that right.
Where issues integrally relate to the federal right, the proposi-
tion that the competence of the federal courts is a function of the
source of the right sued upon provides an accurate test for compet-
ence. For example, there is no question that where Congress has
enacted a federal copyright statute granting renewal rights to children
of deceased copyright holders, the resolution of the question of
whether illegitimate children are within the scope of the statute is
within the competence of the federal judiciary.'" Similarly, where a
federal statute has permitted the taxation of governmental real prop-
erty by a state, the federal courts are competent to determine the
13° See text at notes 59-64 SUPTa.
131 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § § 145, 156-74 (1971).
132 Id. at § 188.
33 Id. at § 209.
' 34 See id. at § 198.
133 See id. at § §145, 156-74.
136 De Sylva v. hallentine, 351 Um& 570, 580 (1956).
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meaning of "real property" since the issue is an integral element of
the right itself.'"
Where the issue under consideration is not integrally bound up
with the right, but is subsidiary, the mere fact of federal creation of
the right seems insufficient to confer competence on the courts. It is
in this situation that the proposition that the competence of the fed-
eral courts is a function of the right sued upon is imprecise. Federal
competence would be warranted with respect to subsidiary issues only
if the statute were to identify explicitly a federal interest in the mat-
ter, or if the sweep of congressional policy were to encompass that
issue. This analysis is compatible with cases in which federal compe-
tence to choose the rule of decision for subsidiary issues has been as-
serted.
In Dice v. Akron, Canton, & Youngstown R.R. 13" the Supreme
13 ' Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver County. 328 U.S. 204, 210 (1946). A less
obvious illustration of the proposition that where the issue is an element of the right,
federal courts are competent to choose the applicable rule, is found in Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research. Inc., 401 U.S. 321 (1971). The plaintiff in Zenith sued for
patent infringement. As one of its defenses Hazeltine Research Corp. claimed that it
was released from liability to Zenith because of a general release executed by Zenith in
settlement of an antitrust action against other co-conspirators. The Court considered
various rules for determining the effect of a release of one joint tortfeasor on the re-
maining tortfeasors in an antitrust context, and chose to establish as the uniform fed-
eral rule a standard providing that the effect on joint tortfeasors of a release of an an-
titrust claim is to be determined by the intention of the parties. Id. at 345.47. The
Court's holding bears superficial resemblance to the issues in Three Rivers and has in
fact been cited in support of the proposition that federal law should displace state law
in governing the release of antitrust claims. Three Rivers Motors Co. v. Ford Motor
Co., 374 F. Supp. 620, 624 (W.D. Pa, 1974). The Courts focus in Zenith, however, was
not on a subsidiary issue sounding in contract, but rather was on a condition or limita-
tion of the right itself.
In deciding the effect of a release of one joint tortfeasor on other joint tort-
feasors, the Court did not establish a principle of construction. Rather, the Court de-
termined the effect of a valid release on parties who did not negotiate the release. As
such, the Court did not touch upon the appropriate rule for determining the validity
and scope of the release relative to the parties who negotiated the contract.
Not surprisingly, in the parallel situation of horizontal conflict, the question of
the effect of a release on joint tortfeasors is treated as an element of the right.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or CONFLICT OF LAWS § 170 (1971). The sovereign creating the
right supplies the rule for releases of joint. tortfeasors, Id.
Federal courts have similarly recognized the distinction between the federal in-
terest in the effect of releases on joint tortfeasors and the interpretation of releases of
antitrust claims. Three Rivers, 522 F.2d 885, 890-91 (3d Cir. 1975) of course does not
follow Zenith and chooses to apply state law. See also Schott Enterprises, Inc. v. Pepsico,
Inc., 520 F.2d 1298, 1300 (6th' Cir. 1975) (Ohio law allowed settlement of private antitrust
&tints and such  settlement acted as a relea se): Attmco Automatic Transmissions,
Inc. v. Taylor, 407 F. Supp. 430, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (citing Three Rivers for proposition
that general release of antitrust claims bars all claims known or unknown in contrast to
rule of intent advanced in Zenith). Thus, the result in Zenith is understandable as an ex-
ample of federal judicial power to act in order to fill out the elements of the right
created by federal law. It does nut go so far as to support the broad conclusion that
federal courts may totally supplant state law with respect to genuinely contractual ele-
ments of releases.
38
 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
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Court, reversing the Ohio Supreme Court,'" held' 4 ° that federal, and
not state law determined the validity of a release of a cause of action
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)."' In so doing,
the Court reasoned that "the federal rights affording relief to injured
railroad employees under a federally declared standard could be de-
feated if states were permitted to have the final say as to what de-
fenses could and could not be properly interposed to suits under the
Act. , n 142 On the surface this argument seems to identify a release as an
integral part of the right created under FELA. But this identification
of the effect of the release as an element of the right is understanda-
ble not as a necessary condition but as a reflection of the particular
policies implicit in FELA.' 43
 The social goal of FELA to alleviate the
hardship suffered by railroad employees as a consequence of their
employer's negligence, 144combined with recognition of the generally
unequal bargaining power of employees and employers, serve to jus-
tify federal judicial supervision of releases. This special interest serves
to encompass such releases within the scope of federal power, thus
warranting judicial law-making on the part of the federal courts.
Similarly, the subsidiary issue of the validity of an assignment
was found to be encompassed by federal interests in Wallis v. Pan
American Petroleum Corp."' Defendant Wallis had applied for mineral
leases under the Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands' 46
 and later
executed an assignment of a one-third interest in any leases acquired
under the pending applications to one McKenna. Wallis also sold to
Pan American an option to purchase any lease so acquired."' Subse-
quently, Wallis filed parallel applications tinder the Mineral Leasing
Act of 1920 144
 which applied to "public domain lands."'" The leases
were granted to Wallis under the latter applications. McKenna and
Pan American sued to enforce the assignment and the option agree-
ment, thereby raising the substantive issue whether the written
' 55
 Dice v. Akron C. & Y. R.R., 155 Ohio S. Rep. 185, 98 N.E.2d 301 (1951).
'" 342 U.S. at 361.
" 1 45 U.S.0 §§ 51-60 (1970).
"5
 342 U,S. at 361.
' 43
 Justification for federal scrutiny of releases of causes of action under FELA
has also been found to be rooted in the explicit statutory provision which establishes
that "Mn)/ contract, rule, regulation or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent of
which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from any liability created
by this chapter, shall to that extent be void ... ," 45 U.S.C. * 55 (1970). Apitsch v.
Patapsco & Back Rivers Co., 385 F. Supp. 495, 504 (D. Md. 1974).
'" See, e.g., South Buffalo Ry. v. Ahern, 344 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1953); Ratigan v.
New York Cent. R.R., 291 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 368 U.S. 891 (1961); Fulgham
v. Midland Valley R.R., l67 F. 660, 663 (C.C. Ark. 1909) revd on other grounds 181 F.
91 (8th Cir. 1910).
15
 384 U.S. 63 (1966).
15 30 U.S.C. § §351-59 (1970).
147 384 U.S. at 65.
' 4 ' 30 U.S.C. § 181 et seq. (1970).
14" 384 U.S. at 65.
190
FEDERAL JUDICIAL LAW-MAKING POWER
agreements covered only the leases obtained under the Mineral Leas-
ing Act for Acquired Lands.' 5"
The specific issue before the Supreme Court was whether fed-
eral or suite law should determine the scope of the agreements be-
tween the private parties.'" The Court considered the federal policies
or interest that might relate to the rights of private parties dealing in
those leases.' 52
 The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 explicitly provided
that oil and gas leases shalll be assignable.'" Additionally, the Act
created certain statutory defenses rendering unenforceable options
which did not comply with the statutory provisions.'" These provi-
sions and the general policies they represent reflected a sufficient
federal interest in transfers of federal leases to confer competence on
the federal courts to implement and safeguard those interests. How-
ever, since no uniform rule was required and since the applicable
state rule posed no threat to any federal interest, the Court exercised
its competence by choosing to apply state law.' 55
Neither Wallis nor Dice confronted the situation where no federal
interest in a subsidiary issue was identifiable and thus where the mat-
ter would be arguably beyond the scope of federal judicial compe-
tence. In both cases, federal interests in subsidiary issues were dis-
cernible in policy considerations or in explicit statutory provisions.
United States v. Yazell'" may be read to illustrate the propositon that
the absence of a cognizable federal interest in a subsidiary issue places
that issue beyond the law-making power of the federal courts. The
Supreme Court in Yazell declined to decide whether state law, which
was held to control, applied of its own force.'" Nonetheless, the facts
' 5° Id. at 65.66.
' 5 ' Id. at 67.
152 Id. at 69.
' 53 30 U.S.C.	 187a (1970).
' 54	U.S.C.	 I84(d)(2) (1970).
'6a
	 U.S. at 70-71.
156 382 U.S. 341 (1966).
'" The Court stated:
Although it is unnecessary to decide in the present case whether
Texas law of coverture should apply ex proprio vigore—on the theory that
the contract here was made pursuant and subject to this provision of state
law—or by "adoption" as a federal principle, it is clear that the state rule
should govern.
Id. at 357. By acknowledging the possibility of state law applying of its own force, the
Court suggests that identification of the source of the right sued upon—here, a federal
disaster loan program operating through the Small Business Administration—does not
necessarily resolve the issue of competence. The natural reluctance of federal courts to
identify limits on federal judicial law-making power is apparent in the fact that despite
the Court's explicit decision not to resolve whether state law applied of its own fierce,
Yazdl has been cited as an example of interstitial federal law-making. See Moor v.
County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 702 n.12 (1972) (dictum); United States v. Chappell
Livestock Auction, Inc., 523 F.2d 840, 843 (6th Cir. 1975). But see United States v,
Proctor, 504 F.2d 954, 959 (dissent) (5th Cir. 1974) where ambivalence of Supreme
Court's choice of law posture is acknowledged.
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of Yazell seem to warrant the conclusion that the Court lacked compe-
tence to supplant the state rule.
In Yazell, the issue concerned the competency of a party to con-
tract with the government.' 56
 The Small Business Administration
(SBA) had negotiated a disaster loan with Mr. and Mrs. Yazell. The
loan was secured by a chattel mortgage and included a separate ac-
knowledgement of Mrs. Yazell.'" Under Texas law of coverture,
however, a married woman could not bind her property without a
previous court decree removing her disability to contract. 16° No such
decree had been obtained, and when the government sued for collec-
tion of the debt following default, Mrs. Yazell pleaded the defense of
coverture. 161
Both the majority' 62 and the dissenting opinions' 63 recognized
that the Texas law of coverture was an archaic concept. Notwithstand-
ing the offensiveness of this particular state law, the majority permit-
ted the defense of coverture after identifying those details of the
transaction which seemed to indicate the SBA's intent to conform to
state law.'" The concurring opinion by Justice Harlan entirely dis-
counted the importance of any of the particulars of the transaction in
question.'" Rather, Justice Harlan determined that "the conclusion
that Texas law governs the issue. . . is amply justified by the Court's
appraisal of the competing state and federal interests at stake .. . . "166
Justice Harlan's opinion seems persuasive in that the dominant con-
sideration in the case was the absence of any federal interest in the
capacity of parties to contract with the federal program. The govern-
mental interest identified by the Court was not the effectuation or
implementation of any national policy but was merely the interest of
any private creditor seeking repayment. 167 Thus, it may reasonably be
inferred that in Yazell the absence of a federal interest left the
judiciary without competence to supplant the state rule.
IV. THREE RI VERS RECONSIDERED
Recognition that federal judicial competence is a function of the
scope of federal interests establishes a basis for the reexamination of
Three Rivers. In Three Rivers, the issue under review was whether a re-
lease would be interpreted to bar an antitrust claim.'" Since the issue
of the interpretation of the release of a statutory right is a matter sub-
'" Id. at 343.
16 " Id. at 345.
"" TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. Ax r. 4626 (repealed 1970).
161 382 U.S. at 343.
' 65 1d. at 343, 351.
163 1d. at 361 (Black, J., dissenting).
'" 382 U.S. at 346-48.
1 " Id. at 358 (Harlan, Jr., concurring).
Iga Id.
"'Id. at 348.
'" 522 U.S. at 887.
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sidiary to the establishment of the right, the mere fact that the right is
federally created would not automatically confer competence on the
federal courts to decide independently the scope of the release."
Additionally, no explicit statutory provision provides any guidance
relative to the issue of the interpretation of such releases.'" There-
fore, if federal judicial competence to rule independently on the valid-
ity of the release exists, it must result from policies implicit in antitrust
legislation.
Although different assessments of the importance of private an-
titrust claims may be advanced, it may safely be assumed that private
actions are an important supplement to government actions."' 'den-
1 " The holding in Sohn. Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 371 U.S. 173 (1942).
which states generally that federal law will govern the legal consequences of violations
of federal statutes is inapposite to the position taken in the text. In Sofa, the Court con-
sidered "whether a patent licensee, by virtue of his license agreement, is estopped to
challenge a price-fixing clause in the agreement by showing that the patent is invalid,
and that the price restriction is accordingly unlawful because not protected by the pa-
tent monopoly." Id. at 173. Holding that federal law will not permit local rules of es-
toppel to thwart the purposes of federal antitrust enforcenunt, Id. at 177, the Court
reasoned that the extent and nature of legal consequences of an action proscribed by
federal statute are federal questions to be resolved by reference to the statute and the
policy it implements. Id. at 176. This holding is distinguishable from the situation in
Three Rivers as involving not a question of whether an estoppel would be found to exist
under state or under federal law but whethei an estoppel could operate to shield anti-
trust violations. In deciding it could not, the Supreme Court identified a condition of
the right itself.
A parallel exercise of judicial power in Three Rivers would have involved the tie-
termination whether an antitrust claim could be released. As a condition and limitation
of the right of action, the issue of the possibility of releasing an antitrust claim would
clearly have fallen within the competence of the federal courts. Unlike the matter of' an
estoppel, however, allowing antitrust claims to be released does not violate federal anti-
trust policy. See e.g. Virginia Impression Products Co. v. SCM Corp., 448 f.2d 262, 266
(4th Cir. 1971), cert. den., 405 U.S. 936 (1972); Duffy Theatres, Inc. v. Griffith Consol,
Theatres, Inc., 208 F.2d 316, 324 (10th Cir. 1953), cert. den., 347 U.S. 935 (1954). That
being the case, the court in Three Rivers faced the different question of the scope of a
release that could permissibly serve, according to federal law, to bar an antitrust claim.
L" See Three Rivers, 522 F.2d at 888; Novak v. General Elec. Corp., 282 I. Supp.
1010, 1013 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
' 7 ' It seems neither fruitful nor necessary to precisely delineate the level of im-
portance of private antitrust causes of action, Certainly there is considerable difference
of' opinion as to the centrality and effectiveness of the treble damages provision. See
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY .
 GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAWS, 1955; Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Enforcement and Economic Efficiency: The Uneasy
Case for Treble Damages, 17 J. LAW & ECON. 329 (1974); Loevinger, Private Action—The
Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTITRUST But.i.. 167 (1958); Wheeler, Antitrust Treble-
Damage Actions; Do They Work? 61 CALIF. L. Rix. 1319 (1973); Comment, Antitrust En-•
forcement by Private Parties, 61 YALE L.J. 1010 (1952).
Presumably, any sovereign creating a right of action in individuals is interested in
the enforcement of that right. it is possible to maintain, as has the Third Circuit in
Three Rivers, that that interest is sufficient to warrant control by the creating sovereign
of all matters that affect that right. 522 F.2d at 888-89. This comment, however, views
subsidiary matters sounding in contract as primarily private arrangements, even though
issues of public interest may be involved. With respect to those issues, mere federal cre-
ation of the right is not sufficient to confer legislative power on the federal judiciary.
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tifying the role of private party enforcement, however, does not re-
solve the question of the interest of the federal government in releases
of private causes of actions. For example, federal antitrust policy has
never been held to forbid or even discourage releases or settlements
of antitrust claims. 172 In fact, settlements and releases for considera-
tion are means of implementing federal, policy against anticompetitive
practices." 3 The proper question is whether private party agreements
affecting antitrust claims implicate any federal interest that would
warrant special federal judicial scrutiny of such releases. It is submit-
ted that any federal interest in such private arrangements is remote" 4
and that, as a result, federal courts lack competence to choose the rule
of decision with respect to releases of antitrust claims. Thus, whereas
state law was applied by the Third Circuit in Three Rivers as a matter
of federal choice, state law, in fact, should have applied of its own
force in determining the scope of the release.
The absence of federal interests in Three Rivers may be
highlighted by comparing releases of claims arising under the federal
antitrust laws with those arising under the Federal Employers' Liabil-
ity Act (FELA) 13
 and the Jones Act."' Unlike issues surrounding re-
leases of federal antitrust claims, issues pertaining to releases of FELA
and Jones Act claims are resolved by federal common law.'" Three
considerations, however, distinguish releases of antitrust claims from
releases of claims arising under either FELA or the Jones Act: ( I) the
degree of federal involvement with the parties to the release; (2) the
relative bargaining power of the parties to the release; and (3) the
impact of the release on general statutory policy.
The significant federal presence in the relationship of the releas-
ing parties in cases arising under FELA or the Jones Act provides a
basis for federal judicial scrutiny of releases that is absent where anti-
trust claims are involved. Both FELA and the Jones Act identify a par-
ticular class to benefit from the legislation. FELA establishes a right of
action for railroad workers injured by the negligence of their
employers.'" The Jones Act extends similar protection to seamen. 179
Rather, it is necessary to find a special interest in those subsidiary matters in order to
permit courts to exercise legislative authority that is otherwise reserved to the states.
'" See, e.g., Schott Enterprises, Inc. v. Pepsico, Inc., 520 F.2d 1298, 1300 (6th
Cir. 1975); Virginia Impression Products Co. v. SCM Corp., 448 F.2d 262, 266 (4th Cir.
1971), cert. den., 405 U.S. 936 (1972); Duffy Theatres, Inc. v. Griffith Consol. Theatres,
Inc., 208 F.2d 316, 324 (10th Cir. 1953), cert. den., 347 U.S. 935 (1954).
'" Note, The Role of State Law in Federal Antitrust Treble Damage Actions, 75 1-1Akv,
L. REv, 1395, 1405 (1962).
'" cf. Schott Enterprises, Inc. v. Pepsico, Inc. 520 F.2d 1290, 1300 (6th Cir.
1975) ("Releases of antitrust claims are treated the same as releases of other claims.
There is no public policy against the release of any antitrust claim).
'" 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970).
"6
 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
'" Dice v. Akron City. R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 361 (1952) (FELA); Garrett v.
Moore-McCormack Co., Inc., 317 U.S. 239, 244 (1942) (Jones Act).
'" 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1970).
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These provisions are part of a system of pervasive federal regulation
in which the relationship between the parties covered by the Acts is
defined by federal law.'" Given such federal involvement in the rela-
tionship between employers and employees, it is clear that releases of
causes of action under FELA and the Jones Act fall within the sphere
of federal interest.
In contrast to FELA and the Jones Act, antitrust legislation is
addressed to the definition and prohibition of certain anticompetitive
practices."' The ultimate parties to a private antitrust action are not
subject to general federal control. Thus, their private agreements exe-
cuted in light of state law do not necessarily fall within the sphere of
federal interests.
Perhaps the most critical distinction between releases of antitrust
claims and releases of causes of action under either FELA or the
Jones Act concerns the independence, bargaining strength, and
sophistication of the releasing party. Persons covered under FELA or
the Jones Act are directly subordinate to those parties in whose favor
releases would be granted. The possibility of undue influence on the
part of employers is particularly at odds with the social welfare thrust
of the statutes. Consequently the government has affirmatively inter-
vened to safeguard the goal of alleviating personal hardship caused by
injuries resulting from employer negligence.'"
This protective role has been clearly articulated in Garrett v.
Moore-McCormack Co."3
 which invoked federal law to preserve rights
created under the Jones Act.'s4
 The Court quoted Justice Story's
opinion on seamen's contracts which maintained:
"[Seamen] are emphatically the wards of admiralty . . . If
there is any undue inequality in the terms, any dispropor-
tion in the bargain, any sacrifice of rights on one side
which are not compensated by extraordinary benefits on
the other, the judicial interpretation is that ... advantage
has been taken of the situation of the weaker party."'"
The inherent inequality in bargaining capability between employers
and employees thus serves to warrant special scrutiny of purported re-
179
 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970), O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318
U.S. 36, 38 (1943).
'"" Title 45 of the U.S. Code implements a scheme of federal control over rail-
roads pursuant to Congress' power under the commerce clause. See Second Employers
Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1911). Law-making authority for the Jones Act derives
both from Congress' power to regulate commerce and its power to do what is necessary
and proper to effectuate the federal authority over admiralty. O'Donnell v. Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 39 (1943). See also text at notes 57-60 Se4Pra.
1" See REPORT OI."J'HE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL. COMMITTEE TO STUDY TILE
ANTITRUST LAWS, 1955.
I" See note l44 supra.
'" 1 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
154 1d. at 246-47, citing Harden v. Gordon, Fed. Cas. No. 6047, at pp 480, 485.
In 522 F.2d at 888.
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leases of claims under FELA and the Jones Act.
Parties to release of antitrust claims, however, are not in the con-
tinuing fixed relationship of employer and employee. Rather, such
parties are business entities presumably familiar with the bargaining
process. Disparities of economic power may, of course, exist. Nonethe-
less, businesses retain their essential independence to participate in
arms length bargaining. The facts of Three Rivers illustrate this cir-
cumstance. The president of Three Rivers was represented in negotia-
tions for the release by his attorney.'" Although most of the terms of
the agreement were fixed by Ford Motor Company, Three Rivers was
able to negotiate a specific exception to the general release proposed
by Ford.' 87
 At all times during the negotiations Three Rivers thus op-
erated as an independent entity with the power and presence to de-
cline to sign any release. While one party might have economic lever-
age in such negotiations, this possibility does not seem to warrant spe-
cial federal protection of the bargaining process.' 88 Rather, the ap-
plicable state rules for avoiding contracts would provide protection for
parties to such private agreements.
Finally, the release of a cause of action under FELA or the Jones
Act has policy implications that are absent from the area of antitrust
claims. The release of a personal injury claim extinguishes any right
to further compensation. Since the thrust of both statutes is to com-
pensate for the hardship of personal injury, 18" the federal govern-
ment is understandably reluctant to approve such releases absent con-
vincing evidence that the releasing party has been adequately
compensated.'" A release of an antitrust claim, on the other hand
merely extinguishes the private cause of action for redress of
injuries.'' The government remains free to enforce public policy by
proceeding against the released party.'" Since the public policy
against anticompetitive practices is not exclusively dependent on the
private action, it is not necessary to the effectuation of public policy to
have federal supervision of releases of private party claims.
The distinctions between releases of antitrust claims and releases
of claims under FELA and the Jones Act indicate significant differ-
ences in the respective levels of federal interest in the issue of in-
terpretation of the releases. Since there does not appear to be any
special considerations that would bring the interpretation of releases
of antitrust claims within the sphere of federal interest, it must be
"6 Id.
1 M 7 The argument of economic hardship has been uniformly disapproved as a
basis for avoiding a release of an antitrust claim. E.g.; Suckow Borax Mines Consol. Inc.
v. Borax Consul., Ltd., 185 F.2d 196, 208 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. den., 340 U.S. 48 (1951);
S.E. Rondo'', Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 288 F. Supp. 879 882 (C.D. Call. 1968).
' 1" See note 144 supra.
"" E.g., South Buffalo Ry. v. Ahern, 34 U.S. 367, 372 (1953).
"'Three Rivers, 522 F.2d at 892.
"1 S.E. Rondon Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 288 F. Supp. 879, 882 (C.D. Cal.
1968).
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concluded that the issue is beyond the limits of federal judicial compe-
tence. The issue arises on the legislative landscape where state law,
and not the federal courts, ultimately provides the backstop for fed-
eral legislative action. Consequently, state law should have applied of
its own force in Three Rivers as the rule of decision for the interpreta-
tion of the release.
CONCLUSION
The principles of federalism grounded in the Constitution and
implemented in the Rules of Decision Act impose limits on the law-
making power of the federal courts. An analysis of the structure of
federalism identifies those limits as defined by the scope of cognizable
federal interests. In litigation concerning federal statutory programs,
issues integrally related to the statutory rights are within the sphere of
federal interests and as such are proper matters for the interstitial
law-making of the federal courts. Where subsidiary issues sounding in
contract are involved, the general federal competence may not extend
as far. Thus, an independent determination of judicial law-making
power must be made relative to the subsidiary issue. This determina-
tion involves an examination whether a specific statutory provision or
an implicit policy exists that justifies special federal interest in the
matter. Three Rivers presented the precise situation of a subsidiary
issue—the scope of a release—arising in the context of general fed-
eral competence. No special interest was found to exist warranting
federal intrusion into what was essentially a private transaction based
on legitimate expectations that state law would apply. Therefore the
court lacked competence to choose the applicable rule and state law
should have applied of its own force.
HOWARD STICKLOR
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